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Abstract
We assess the effects of monetary policy shocks on income and wealth
inequality through direct inequality measures and by analyzing several trans-
mission channels explored in recent literature. Furthermore, we analyze two
additional channels: the Housing and the Fiscal channels. The methodol-
ogy adopted is a Bayesian proxy SVAR using a high-frequency identification
based on the external instruments approach. Our own policy shocks are con-
structed for this purpose. The results show that an expansionary monetary
policy shock does not have a significant effect on income inequality due to the
existence of opposite channels, whereas it increases wealth inequality mainly
through the portfolio channel.
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1. Introduction
The recent escalation of income and wealth inequality has produced a
discussion among central bankers on the potential redistributive effects of
monetary policy. Cantillon (1755) in his acclaimed “Essai” published posthu-
mously, expounded his famous “Cantillon effect” that explained how changes
in the money supply lead to changes in both relative prices and the real econ-
omy, which, in turn produce evident redistributive effects. However, even
though these effects have been traditionally considered as a side-effect, with
the arrival of the Great Recession and unconventional measures applied by
the major central banks across the world, the distributive effects of monetary
policy have become one of the main concerns for both central bankers and
academics.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the redistributive effects of
monetary policy on income and wealth inequality through the major channels
identified by previous literature. In addition, as a novelty in the literature, we
consider two additional channels which have not been evaluated previously,
at least not in a integral way. Specifically, we use a Bayesian proxy structural
vector autoregression (proxy SVAR) following Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2018a) to study the potential effects of expansionary monetary policy shocks
on income and wealth inequality. Even though some works have applied the
proxy SVAR approach to assess the distributive effects of monetary policy
(Samarina and Nguyen (2019)), the combination of the Bayesian perspective
and the proxy SVAR identification has not been used in this research field.
For this purpose, we also construct our own monetary policy surprises based
on the works of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Kuttner (2001).
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The seminal work by Coibion et al. (2017) identifies five channels through
which monetary policy affects income and wealth distribution. First, the sav-
ing redistribution channel arises from an unexpected expansionary monetary
policy that reduces the interest rate or has the effect of increasing infla-
tion, which will benefit the real value of borrowers (normally poorer house-
holds) compared to the real value of savers (Nakajima (2015) and Doepke
and Schneider (2006)). Second, the earnings heterogeneity channel appears
since lower-income households are more likely to be unemployed (extensive
margin) and see their wages reduced (intensive margin) if a monetary con-
traction occurs due to the contraction in the aggregate demand (Carpenter
and Rodgers (2004); Heathcote et al. (2010) or Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou
(2017)). Third, the financial segmentation channel works on the assumption
that households with higher income and wealth tend to be more connected
to financial markets. Hence, monetary policy-induced changes may benefit
these households with better conditions (Williamson (2008) or Finer (2018)).
Fourth, the income composition channel occurs when the composition of in-
come is different across households. Hence, if an expansionary monetary pol-
icy shock boosts capital income more than labor income, and since the share
of capital income is higher among the rich, this monetary policy shock would
increase income inequality (Galbraith (2000) and Coibion et al. (2017)). Fi-
nally, the portfolio channel occurs when the size and composition of asset
portfolios differs across households. On the assumption that higher-income
households hold a greater proportion of their wealth in assets, they would
benefit more from an expansionary monetary policy that increases the price
of assets (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012); Saiki and Frost (2014) or Al-
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bert et al. (2019)).
The empirical literature on the impact of monetary policy on income and
wealth inequality yields mixed conclusions (see Colciago et al. (2019) for a
complete survey). On the one hand, Coibion et al. (2017) show that contrac-
tionary monetary policy shocks lead to an increase in income inequality in the
US, especially through the saving redistribution channel and the earnings het-
erogeneity channel. This outcome is found by Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou
(2017) in the UK, by Furceri et al. (2017) for a panel of 32 advanced and
emerging market countries and by O’Farrell et al. (2016) for the US and
Canada. However, other studies show that an expansionary monetary policy
would increase income and in particular wealth inequality, mainly through
the portfolio channel (Domanski et al. (2016) for some countries in the Euro-
zone, Inui et al. (2017) and Saiki and Frost (2014) for Japan or Dolado et al.
(2018) and Berisha et al. (2018) for the US).
Additionally, according to these contradictory results and to Bernanke
(2015), in order to explore and quantify the full effects of monetary policy
on income and wealth inequality, it is important to identify all channels
through which monetary policy could have distributive effects. Taking this
into account, we identify and quantify two additional transmission channels
which have not been properly explored in previous literature.
First, we explore the housing channel. Although this channel has already
been identified in previous literature (see Domanski et al. (2016) or Colciago
et al. (2019)), it has not been fully explored. More specifically, the empirical
literature has analysed the distributional effects of monetary policy on wealth
through increases in house prices (see Lenza and Slacalek (2018)). However,
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this work also assesses the fact that monetary policy could imply changes
in rent prices and, therefore, imply distributive effects on income as well.
On the one hand, as evidenced by the conventional literature, expansionary
monetary policy could increase housing prices (see Piazzesi and Schneider
(2016) for a complete survey). This fact could reduce wealth inequality on
the assumption that lower-income households hold a greater proportion of
their wealth in housing (Wolff (2016)). However, on the other hand, rising
housing prices may mean that some vulnerable groups, such as younger peo-
ple, may face prohibitive prices when it comes to gaining access to buying a
home. Moreover, this fact could increase rental incomes and benefit higher-
income households who earn proportionally more of their income in this way
(Bonnet et al. (2014)) and, hence, increase income inequality. Additionally,
we should take into account that for low-income homeowners, the increase
in housing prices could not increase the consumption and well-being of this
group of households. It is explained due to the higher transaction costs these
households face when they come to dispose of their properties. Furthermore,
households with only one property do not benefit from higher home prices
since they need a place to live. We assess and quantify the “wealth effect”
and the “income effect” of the housing channel separately among different
households in order to study the effects of monetary policy on income and
wealth distribution through the housing channel.
Finally, as a novelty in the literature, we add the fiscal channel. The re-
lationship between monetary and fiscal policy has gained importance in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. New ways of iteration among these policies
are being explored, as well as their role in determining macroeconomic out-
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comes. A great example of this is the fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper
and Leith (2016) and Williamson (2008)). However, our purpose is not to
explore monetary and fiscal policy jointly, but to study the fiscal effects of
monetary policy and how these could affect income inequality. It is clear
that the goal of the Federal Reserve is to stabilize the economy through price
and unemployment targets. However, to achieve its goal, changes in mone-
tary policy could have some implications for fiscal policy and consequently
for income inequality. Dahan (1998) identifies five channels through which
monetary policy could have fiscal effects. 1) Expenditure effect: if a tight
monetary policy leads to a reduction in output and employment, the govern-
ment can choose to cushion this effect caused by monetary policy through
implementing a more aggressive fiscal policy (increasing government spend-
ing or reducing taxes). 2) Revenue effect: if a tight monetary policy drives
down output and employment, taxes and other government revenues could
be reduced which, in turn, would increase the government budget deficit.
Moreover, this deficit could be higher as a consequence of automatic sta-
bilizers. The final decision of the government to adjust budget deficit via
discretional fiscal policy, or not, will determine the final effect of this chan-
nel. 3) Debt effect: assuming sticky prices, if a tight monetary policy results
in a higher short-term interest rate and, as a consequence, a higher long-term
interest rate, this could increase the debt servicing for interest and increase
the budget deficit with a higher interest rate. This is true not only when
the Fed changes interest rates by using conventional monetary policy, but
also when it changes rates using unconventional monetary policy such as
large-scale asset purchase operations, via an effect on risk premium Gagnon
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(2010). 4) Seigniorage effect: if a tight monetary policy reduces revenues for
seigniorage, which are usually transferred to the government, this would have
implications for the public budget and for fiscal decisions Carpenter et al.
(2015). 5) Price effect: a lower rate of inflation as a consequence of a tight
monetary policy can lead to a lower rate of erosion of the nominal interest
payments and a higher real value of public debt, changing the path of fiscal
consolidation Sims (2013). According to these channels, it seems plausible
that monetary policy could have implications for fiscal policy decisions and,
consequently, this could have distributive effects. However, the manifesta-
tion of these effects on income inequality depends on the many factors that
are exogenous decisions of policy makers. For example, the savings in the
payment of interest on the debt caused by an expansionary monetary policy
could be destined to social programs that reduce inequality or to a decrease
in taxes with less clear distributional effects. Therefore, even if monetary
policy had fiscal effects, these effects on inequality would not be evident.
Empirically, using direct measures of inequality, our results suggest that
an expansionary monetary policy shock increases wealth inequality mainly
driven by the portfolio channel. However, we do not find statistical sig-
nificance when we assess the final effect of the monetary policy shock on
income inequality. A plausible explanation is due to the existence of oppos-
ing channels. More specifically, we find that saving redistribution, earnings
heterogeneity as well as fiscal and housing channels could reduce income
inequality following an expansionary monetary policy, whereas the income
composition channel would work in the opposite direction making the final
effect of monetary policy on income inequality ambiguous.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical
model used and the identification strategy. In section 3, we present the
empirical results on income and wealth inequality measures and the trans-
missions channels. Section 4 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. The model
The methodology adopted is Bayesian proxy structural vector autore-
gression (Bayesian proxy SVAR). This technique is the result of estimating
impulse response functions (IRFs) by combining identification with external
instruments and Bayesian methods in a vector autoregression setting. Let Yt
be the vector of variables of interest to be explained. The structural form of
the VAR representation can be represented as
AYt = C +
p∑
j=1
BjYt−j + εt (1)
where A is a nxn matrix representing the contemporaneous relationship
between the endogenous variables and n denotes the length of the endogenous
variables, Yt is a nx1 vector that contains the baseline variables in the base-
line, C is a nx1 vector of constant terms, Bj is a nxn matrix that captures
the coefficients associated with each lagged variable and εt is a nx1 vector
denoting the structural error terms.
Given the potential problem of identification due to the endogenous vari-
ables, we cannot uniquely identify the structural relationships between the
variables included in Yt. For this reason, we estimate the reduced form VAR
in order to recover the structural parameters of interest afterwards.
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ΦjYt−j + ut (2)
where c = A−1C; Φj = A
−1Bj and ut = A
−1εt.
The nx1 vector ut represents the reduced form residuals with V ar(ut) =
Σ, ut follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance Σ, i.e., ut ∼
N(0,Σ). We set the lag length to twelve based on the Aikaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC) and the reduced form model is estimated at monthly
frequency from 1982M1 to 2014M12.





log (Consumer price index)
Excess bond premium
One-year government treasury bill rate
Ten-year real interest rate
Difference between white and black Americans’ unemployment rate




log (Real S&P 500)
log (Real S&P 500/Case-Shiller home price index)
log (U.S. non-defense government expenditures)
log (U.S. gross government investment)
Gini index of income inequality
log (Top 1 wealth) - log (Next 19 wealth)
log (Top 1 wealth) - log (Middle 3 wealth)
log (Next 19 wealth) - log (Middle 3 wealth)

The first four variables1capture measures of real economic activity, prices,
1The responses of Industrial production, the consumer price index and excess bond
premium in the baseline are consistent with macroeconomic theory. Furthermore, these
results are also obtained by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2018b). The IRFs for these activity, price and financial variables are shown in figure A.6
in Appendix A.
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as well as financial and interest rate conditions. We use the one-year gov-
ernment treasury bill rate (GS1) as the policy indicator, which indicates the
stance of monetary policy. This longer-term rate is a more proper policy indi-
cator -as opposed to federal funds- for assessing the response of interest rates
to monetary policy shocks. Following Gertler and Karadi (2015), govern-
ment bond rates are useful since their innovations also contain information
about forward guidance, i.e., changes in expectations about the future path
of monetary policy and yields at longer horizons.
Moreover, we consider the following variables2 as representatives of each
inequality transmission channel and direct measures of income and wealth
inequality. For the saving redistribution channel, the ten-year real interest
rate is used as benchmark. According to the earnings heterogeneity channel,
we use the difference in unemployment rates between white Americans and
black African American workers and the ratio of labour earnings to the same
racial groups for the extensive margin and the intensive margin respectively.
Real wages and real dividends are considered for the income composition
channel. In order to evaluate the portfolio channel, the real S&P 500 price
index stock is used as representative of this channel. According to the two
additional channels, we consider the real S&P/Case-Shiller national home
price and real rents for the housing channel. For the fiscal channel, the U.S.
non-defense government expenditures and the U.S. gross government invest-
ment are considered as measures of the fiscal policy. Finally, for the direct
inequality measures we use the Gini index of income inequality and we con-
2The detailed explanation of the construction of the variables considered is explained
in appendix B.
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struct the differences between percentile groups of the cross-sectional wealth
distribution of log levels as measures of wealth inequality by considering three
percentile groups: the Top 1%, the Next 19% and the Middle 3 quintiles. The
construction of these variables are carefully explained in Appendix B.
Given the large set of variables in the baseline, we adopt a Bayesian per-
spective in order to deal with the curse of dimensionality induced by the
structure of the model. We follow the algorithm of Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco (2018a) where a standard Normal-Inverse Wishart (NIW) conjugate
priors is assumed as prior distributions for (Φ, Σ). Therefore, a multivariate
normal distribution is assumed for the regression coefficients, and an In-
verse Wishart specification for the covariance matrix of the error term. This
assumption is chosen so that prior expectations and variances of Φ coincide
with the so called ‘Minnesota’ prior proposed originally by Litterman (1986).
2.2. Identification
Before explaining the identification of monetary policy surprises, it is
worth mentioning that the definition of a monetary policy surprise is not
easy to define, specifically after the multidimensional policy actions carried
out during the Great Recession period. We follow Gerko and Rey (2017) de-
noting a monetary policy shock3 as an unanticipated movement in the current
monetary policy stance or about changes in future policy expectations.
The identification strategy used to recover the structural parameters of
interest in equation 1 is the external instruments or proxy SVAR approach
based on the works of Gertler and Karadi (2015), Mertens and Ravn (2013)
3We also consider as robustness test the different factors of Swanson (2015) as proxies
for different monetary policy actions during the zero lower bound period.
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and Stock and Watson (2012). The basic idea under this identification strat-
egy is to exploit the information of a variable not included in the model
(instrument) that contains information in monetary surprises.
Under this scenario, either the Cholesky decomposition or sign restric-
tion may not be adequate for estimating the impulse response functions to
a monetary policy shock. Cholesky factorization imposes the matrix A to
be a lower triangular matrix meaning that the variables ordered earlier do
not react to a shock of the variables ordered later. Therefore, the order of
the VAR specification does matter and we may obtain unstable and sensitive
responses depending on the order position of the variable reflecting the mon-
etary policy stance. In addition, the Cholesky scheme may lead to price and
activity puzzles (see also Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino
(2016)). Furthermore, given that the effect of monetary policy is a priori
ambiguous because of the number of channels through which these actions
affect agents (see Coibion et al. (2017)), the adoption of sign restrictions may
provide misleading results for the responses on income and wealth inequality.
Due to the fact that we are only interested in the responses to a monetary
policy shock, it is sufficient to identify only the shock associated with the
policy indicator, i.e, the one-year government treasury bill rate. Therefore,









given that ut = A
−1εt. c
mp ∈ c represents the constant term associated
to the monetary policy equation. a denotes the unknown column of matrix
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A−1 that represents the responses to the associated monetary policy shock.
Thus, we can represent the structural form representation of the variables







t ∀i 6= mp (4)
Assuming this partition, the structural shocks contained in εt can also







t represents all the structural shocks
in equation 4. Thus, εmpt represents the structural shock associated with the
policy indicator and εrt represents the structural shock associated with all
other endogenous variables at period t. Note that the reduced form residuals
are a linear combination of the structural shocks εt through the inverse
4 of
vector A. Hence, the reduced VAR innovations ut can be represented as a







t contains all the reduced-form residuals
but the one associated to monetary policy. Hence, umpt represents the reduced
form residual associated with the policy indicator and urt denotes the reduced
form residual associated with all other variables included in Yt. For a more
detailed and technical description of how to obtain IRFs, see Gertler and
Karadi (2015)
Under this condition, having an external instrument that satisfies the
following conditions is required
E(Ztε
mp
t ) = φ (5)
4In order to satisfy this condition, we have to assume invertibility. If this assumption




t ) = 0 (6)
where φ 6= 0. These are the traditional assumptions required for obtain-
ing an instrument for εmpt .The first assumption is the relevance condition
5
that implies that the set of instruments has to be correlated with the struc-
tural shock of the policy indicator. The second assumption is the exogeneity
condition meaning that the set of instruments has to be uncorrelated with
the structural shocks associated with the remaining endogenous variables in
Yt. This condition is essential in order to solve the problem of identification
that we face. The typical challenge of the instrumental variable approach is
to satisfy the exogeneity condition since it cannot be tested.
The current month’s federal fund future (FF1) is used as instrument to
identify the policy shocks. According to Ramey (2016), this future contract
measures how the market changes its expectations about the Fed Funds rate
in the current month from the current date given the new information re-
ceived by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Furthermore, fi-
nancial futures data are ideal for ensuring that a shock is unanticipated.
Moreover, the availability of intradaily frequency of future contracts allow to
consider changes in future contracts in a tight window around FOMC meet-
ings as monetary surprises. By having a time restriction, the variation of the
FF1 will most likely due to monetary policy decisions (see Gürkaynak et al.
(2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)). Thus, the FF1 instrument is
likely to satisfy the exogeneity assumption.
5Results of the F-statistic in the first-stage regression for each specification is provided
in table C.2 in Appendix C.
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We construct our own shocks on the basis of the methodology proposed by
Kuttner (2001), Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
The basic idea of this approach is to identify the surprise component due to
a monetary policy announcement by means of the change in first-differences
in the federal fund rate around the FOMC dates. The time-frame considered
to identify these surprises was a tight window of 30-minutes, which begins 10
minutes before the monetary policy announcement up until 20 minutes after
the monetary policy release. Over the period analyzed, specifically, from July
1979 to February 2018, we use the shocks provided by Gertler and Karadi
(2015) up to July 2012 and from July 2012 to February 2018 we built our
own shocks where 46 additional monetary policy meetings took place.
Due to the structure of the federal fund futures, its payoff is calculated
by the average effective federal funds rate that has prevailed over the cal-
endar month specified in the contract. For this reason, it is necessary to
apply a scale factor. Hence, the monetary surprise at each FOMC meeting
is calculated as




where we denotemp1t as the surprise component due to a monetary policy
announcement. t − ∆t represents the time immediately before the FOMC
commitment, d is the day of the FOMC commitment and D are the days of
the month on which the FOMC commitments take place.
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3. Results
For ease of exposition, we split the results of the baseline into two sub-
sections as follows. First, the impulse responses of the income and wealth
inequality measures are shown in figure 1. Second, the responses of the
potential channels through which monetary policy operate are displayed in
figure 4.
3.1. Results of monetary policy on income and wealth inequality
The estimated responses of the direct measures of income and wealth
inequality are shown in figure 1. According to the responses for the Gini
index of income inequality (Gini Income), an expansionary monetary policy
shock of 20 basis points has no statistically significant response in all the
horizons considered. The absence of statistical significance in terms of in-
come inequality is in line with the recent literature that does not show a
common pattern regarding the effects of monetary policy on income distri-
bution (see Colciago et al. (2019) for a complete survey). In this vein, several
studies suggest that conventional monetary tightening could increase income
inequality (Coibion et al. (2017) for the U.S., Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou
(2017) for U.K. and Samarina and Nguyen (2019) for the Euro Area. How-
ever, recent studies focusing on the distributional effects of unconventional
monetary policy show that expansionary monetary policy also could increase
income inequality (Berisha et al. (2018) for the U.S., Inui et al. (2017) and
Saiki and Frost (2014) for Japan and El Herradi and Leroy (2019) for a set
of 12 advanced economies.
To evaluate the effects of monetary policy on wealth inequality, we con-
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sider differences between different percentile groups of the cross-sectional
distribution of log levels. In particular we consider three percentile groups:
the Top 1%, the Next 19% and the Middle 3 quintiles. As can be observed,
expansionary monetary policy increases the differences in the wealth distribu-
tion, suggesting that loosening monetary policy increases wealth inequality.
In particular, a one standard deviation monetary policy shock has a statis-
tically significant positive impact on wealth inequality up to 5 months after
the shock approximately. In all cases, the responses of the differences are
positive, showing that upper shares benefit more than lower shares from the
expansionary shock of monetary policy. These results are in line with recent
literature which point out that expansionary monetary policy could increase
wealth inequality mainly driven by its effect on stock prices (see Albert and
Gómez-Fernández (2018) for the U.S., Saiki and Frost (2014) for Japan and
Domanski et al. (2016) for a set of developed economies).
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Figure 1: Inequality measures for the baseline
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:2014M2. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
To check the validity of the results, alternative measures of economic
inequality are considered. First, the Gini index of wealth inequality is con-
sidered. We replace the wealth inequality measures in the baseline by the
Gini index. The resulting IRFs in Figure 2 display the results on income
and wealth inequality. Regarding income inequality, we still obtain a non-
statistically significant response to a 20 basis point expansionary monetary
policy shock. Results on wealth inequality shows a positive statistically sig-
nificant response implying an increase in wealth inequality.
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Figure 2: Gini indexes of income and wealth inequality
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the Gini indexes of income and wealth inequality. Sample: 1982M1:2014M2.
Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
Moreover, we consider the Gini index of pre-tax income and post-tax
income constructed by Coibion et al. (2017). Figure 3 shows the responses
on income and wealth inequality. As can be observed, the responses on wealth
inequality are still the same as in the baseline. In addition, the responses
after an expansionary monetary policy shock on the new measures of income
inequality are not significant. Thus, we can conclude that the results are
robust to the consideration of alternative inequality measures.
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Figure 3: Gini indexes of pre-tax and post-tax income inequality
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the Gini indexes of pre-tax and post-tax income inequality. Sample:
1982M1:2014M2. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
3.2. Results of transmission channels
The empirical evidence in section 3.1 suggests that expansionary mone-
tary policy does not affect income inequality but does increase wealth dispar-
ity. Given these results, it is crucial to assess the effect of monetary policy
on the potential transmission channels that affect the distribution of income
and wealth in order to accurately understand the distributional effects of
monetary policy. However, it is important to emphasize that this part is
only qualitative and suggestive and does not offer a quantification of the rel-
evance of the different channels. Still, it may be a relevant analysis to know
the direction and sign of these channels. Figure 4 shows the IRFs of the
inequality transmission channels identified by Coibion et al. (2017) and the
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two additional channels we identify.
First, to explore the saving redistribution channel, we evaluate the ten-
year real interest rate. According to the standard theory, we show that
real interest rate is statically reduced after an expansive monetary shock,
although only for the first month after the shock. A similar result is also
observed, for example, by Gertler and Karadi (2015). Hence, according to
the assumption that a reduction in real interest rates will hurt savers and
benefit borrowers (Nakajima (2015); Doepke and Schneider (2006)) since
lenders belong to the higher-income households and borrowers to the lower-
income households, this channel would tend to reduce income inequality.
To analyse the earnings heterogeneity channel, we use two indicators of
this channel. First, to assess the extensive margin, that is the job creation,
we use the difference in unemployment rates between white Americans and
black African American workers as an indicator. Unfortunately, we do not
have labor data for the different groups of household incomes, but we rely
on the plausible assumption that blacks are usually located in the bottom
part of the income and wealth distribution (this assumption has been shown
for instance by Wolff (2016) or Kuhn et al. (2019)). Hence, a monetary
shock which reduces this difference among these unemployment rates, would
reduce income inequality (Blanchard (1995)). The result of this indicator
shows that the expansionary monetary policy shock reduces the gap between
these two unemployment rates, although the response of this variable is only
slightly significant since the month fourth to seventh following the shock.
As predicted by Blanchard (1995) and empirically shown by Carpenter and
Rodgers (2004), we find that an expansionary monetary policy shock bene-
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fits more racial minorities, reducing the gap in unemployment rates among
both racial groups. Hence, under the assumption that racial minorities are
in the bottom part of income distribution, the expansionary shock would
reduce income inequality. Second, to explore the intensive margin, that is
the change in labor earnings, we use the ratio between the labor earnings of
white workers and black workers as an indicator. By doing so, we do not
find any statistically significant effect in this ratio. Thus, it shows that the
wages of minorities are not more sensitive to monetary policy than those of
whites. Therefore, the intensive margin of this channel does not seem to
affect income inequality, again under the assumption that racial minorities
are usually located at the lower end of the income distribution.
To evaluate the income composition channel we use real wages and divi-
dends as indicators. Firstly, in order to analyze real wages we have used the
real (log) average hourly earnings. The response of real wages to monetary
policy shocks has been explored in the empirical literature, but the findings
show ambiguous results. On the one hand, Keynes’s general theory predicts
that real wages are contra-cyclical due to the sticky-wage theory. In this
scenario, as nominal wages are fixed, an aggregate demand shock moves real
wages and employment in different directions. However, more recent em-
pirical literature shows that real wages are slightly pro-cyclical. Normandin
(2006) explains that the behavior and the effect of the real wage response can
give an indication of the relative importance of nominal wage versus nominal
price rigidities. If nominal wage stickiness is relatively more important, then
real wages could fall following an expansionary monetary policy shock. By
contrast, when price stickiness and limited participation restrictions are rel-
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atively more important, real wages should rise in line with output. Focusing
on the responses of real wages, we find that they decrease in response to an
expansionary monetary shock, being statistically significant during the first
three months after the shock. These results are in line with Keynes’s general
theory and with other works from the U.S., such as Sims and Zha (1999);
Bernanke et al. (2005) or Perry et al. (2015). This result is important for
us because if an expansionary monetary policy is causing real wages to de-
cline, this might increase short-term income inequality since the majority of
a lower-income household’s income derives from the job market (Galbraith
(2000). Secondly, we analyse the behavior of real dividends using (log) real
dividends which come from the SP 500 index. In this case, as conventional
theory predicts (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)), we find that an expansion-
ary monetary policy increases real dividends and this effect is statistically
significant for up to 7 months after the shock. Hence, since higher-income
households receive more income from dividends (Nakajima (2015) or Furceri
et al. (2017)), this would increase income inequality . Hence, the responses
of these two indicators suggest that expansionary monetary policies could in-
crease income inequality considering the different impact and the distribution
of these two different sources of income among households.
We use the (log) real price index (SP 500) stock as an indicator to assess
the portfolio channel. The response of this variable shows that the reaction
of the S&P 500 is strong and statistically significant for up to 7 months
after the monetary shock. Even so, the effect is quite durable and it reaches
its maximum effect 1 month after the shock when the S&P 500 increases by
about 1.8 percent. According to Wolff (2016), since higher-wealth households
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hold a greater proportion of their wealth in stocks (Szymborska (2019)), they
would benefit more from an expansive monetary policy that increases the
price of these financial assets.
As a contribution of this paper, we also include in our model several
indicators to explore the new channels described in the introduction sec-
tion. With regard to the “wealth effects” of the housing channel, we use the
(log) SP/Case-Shiller national home price as an indicator. We do not find
a statistic significant response of this indicator. This result is also found by
Kuttner (2012) who points out that the impact of interest rates on housing
prices appears to be quite modest. According to these results and under the
assumption that lower-wealth households hold a greater proportion of their
wealth in housing (see Wolff (2016)), the non-effect of monetary policy on
home prices would not reduce wealth inequality to compensate for the ef-
fect of the portfolio channel leading a final increase in wealth inequality as
we showed in the previous subsection. On the other hand, to explore the
“income effects” of the housing channel, we also estimate the price index
for rent in order to analyse the response to a monetary policy shock. The
response of this indicator shows that an expansionary monetary shock sig-
nificantly reduces the price index for rent in the first three months after the
shock. This result can seem counter-intuitive, but is also found by Duarte
and Dias (2016) who provide an explanation for this price puzzle. Accord-
ing to these authors, in the presence of nominal or financial friction, when
interest rates increase, the real cost of owning a house increases, and this in-
crease may make some people prefer to rent instead of buying. This change
in consumption behavior increases the price of rents relative to other goods.
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According to this outcome, an expansionary monetary policy could reduce
income inequality on the assumption that renters are at the upper end of
the income distribution (Bonnet et al. (2014)). Therefore, we conclude that
the housing channel does not reduce wealth inequality by mitigating the ef-
fect produced by the portfolio channel but it could reduce income inequality
through declining rents.
Finally, to explore the fiscal channel, we use two fiscal expenditures as
fiscal indicators. They are U.S. non-defense public expenditures and U.S.
gross public investment. The results of these two indicators show that the
expansionary shock raises both indicators, reaching peaks at around 0.4%
and 0.3% in non-defense public expenditure and U.S. gross public investment
respectively. Hence, according to these results, we observe that monetary
expansion increases fiscal expenditures as predicted by Dahan (1998) and,
hypothetically, if fiscal expansion serves to finance social programs, it could
reduce inequalities, although, as we pointed out in the introduction, the
final effect on income and wealth inequality will depend on the decisions
of policy makers. Therefore, although our results suggest that monetary
expansion increases fiscal expenditures, we have no evidence to show that
this necessarily reduces income inequality.
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Figure 4: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline. Sample:
1982M1:2014M2. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
3.3. Robustness checks
To check the validity of the results with respect to the representatives of
each inequality channel, we estimate a different baseline specification. Specif-
ically, we consider the unemployment gap between Hispanics and American
whites as representative for the extensive margin of the earnings heterogene-
ity channel. The (log) real stock price index (Dow Jones) is considered as the
indicator for the portfolio channel, whereas the U.S. defense expenditures for
the fiscal channel. The resulting IRFs are provided in figure 5. According to
the earnings heterogeneity channel, specifically in the extensive margin, an
expansionary monetary policy shock by 20 basis points has no statistically
significant response on the unemployment gap between Hispanics and Amer-
ican whites workers. This result is also obtained by Carpenter and Rodgers
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(2004). We obtain a similar response in magnitude and significance for the
portfolio channel. For the fiscal channel, a monetary policy shock increases
U.S. defense expenditures. In particular, the increase in fiscal policy is sig-
nificant between the sixth and the tenth months after the shock reaching a
peak of 0.24 percent. We observe that loosening monetary policy also in-
creases fiscal expenditures as the results for the baseline model. In addition,
note that the responses of the remaining inequality channels that do not
change their specifications are similar to the IRFs of the baseline. Thus,
this result suggest the robustness of the analysis with regard to the baseline
specification.
Figure 5: Alternative inequality transmission channels for the baseline
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the alternative monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:2014M2. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
Given that the sample of the baseline considered contains the zero lower
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bound period, the use of the one-year government treasury bill rate as policy
indicator to reflect the stance of monetary policy limits the informativeness
of the Federal Reserve rate. To check the validity of the results with respect
to the recent years of the estimation sample, we first estimate the responses
of the baseline using the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate instead of the policy
indicator adopted in the baseline. Figures D.7-D.8 show the IRFs considering
the shadow rate. As can be observed, the responses are similar to the IRFs
provided by using the the one-year government treasury bill rate. In addition,
the responses of the direct inequality measures and the inequality channels
have similar magnitude. The baseline is also estimated up to 2008 where the
federal fund rate reached the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary
policy measures began to be applied. The resulting IRFs are provided in
figures D.9-D.10. The responses on inequality are similar to the IRFs for the
baseline estimated using all the sample. According to the inequality channels,
the magnitude of the IRFs is identical and the responses are slightly less
statistically significant. Overall, the results are not affected by the inclusion
of the recent period after the financial crisis.
In addition, we also account for the several dimensions of monetary pol-
icy actions during the zero lower bound period considering the two factors
of Swanson (2015) as proxies for forward guidance and large-scale asset pur-
chases (LSAP) policies respectively 6. Figures D.11-D.12 and figures D.13-
D.14 show the responses to a forward guidance and LSAP monetary policy
shock respectively. The IRFs have practically similar direction and signifi-
cance with respect to the baseline. According to the responses to a LSAP
6We thank Eric Swanson for sharing with us the monetary policy shocks.
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monetary policy shock, only the income composition and portfolio channels
are statistically significant. However, results are similar for the direct mea-
sures of inequality. Thus, we can conclude that results on inequality are
robust to the consideration of different monetary policy shocks.
On the other hand, we estimate the baseline considering the indications
of the Schwarz bayesian criteria (SBC). Hence, we set the lag length to three
following the SBC. Figures D.15-D.16 display the results considering this lag
length criterion. As can be observed, the significance levels and the magni-
tude of the responses are analogous to the IRFs for the baseline considering
the AIC. The magnitude of the responses on inequality adopting the SBC
are slightly smaller than under the AIC. Thus, the results are robust to the
adoption of different lag length criteria.
To check the robustness of the results with respect to the potential mis-
specification of the VAR adopted in the baseline, we consider the estimation
of the baseline with the methodology of Bayesian Local Projections (BLP)
proposed by Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018b). This methodology has
the flexibility of LP and the robustness to control for mispecification that
may be present in VAR. If the baseline consider is misspecified, the IRFs
will be biased with respect to the responses using BLP. Figures D.17-D.18
show the IRFs under the BLP approach. As can be observed, the magnitude
of the IRFs is similar to the baseline estimated by Bayesian proxy SVAR.




The rise in income and wealth inequality in the U.S. in recent years has
increased the attention of academics and policymakers on the redistributive
effects of monetary policy. In this paper, we assess the effects of monetary
policy shocks on income and wealth inequality in the U.S. through direct
inequality measures and by analyzing several transmission channels explored
in recent literature. In addition, we assess two new channels less considered
by previous research, these are the housing and the fiscal channels. For this
purpose, we use a Bayesian proxy structural vector auto-regression (proxy
SVAR) constructing our own monetary shocks. Using several direct measures
of wealth distribution, our findings suggest that an expansionary monetary
policy shock increases wealth inequality. The increases in wealth inequality
could be explained due to the portfolio channel. However, we do not find
any significant response when we assess the final effect of monetary policy on
income inequality. We find that expansionary monetary policy could reduce
income inequality through saving redistribution, earnings heterogeneity as
well as the fiscal and the housing channels. However, the opposite result is
found when we analyze the income composition channel due to the contra-
cyclical behavior of real wages and the pro-cyclical reaction of real dividends.
The complexity of the mechanisms that link monetary policy and inequal-
ity is due to the fact that there are several channels that have an impact in
the opposite direction that leads to an uncertain net effect. An adequate
study of the distributional effects of monetary policy taking into account all
potential channels is important not only to improve our knowledge of the
side effects of monetary measures applied by central banks, especially after
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the financial crisis, but also for the effectiveness of the monetary policy itself.
It is clear that the objective of the Federal Reserve is and should be to
fulfill its mandate to achieve maximum employment and price stability, thus
providing broad benefits to the economy. In addition, other types of policies
are more appropriate to address concerns about inequality (fiscal policy or
income policy). However, the most recent research indicates that monetary
policies can also have important distributive effects and should be taken into
account when properly designing these policies.
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Appendix A. Responses of economic and financial variables
Figure A.6: Economic and financial variables for the baseline
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for IP, CPI, EBP and GS1 from the baseline. Sample: 1982M1:2014M2. Shaded
regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
Appendix B. Construction of variables
We show in this appendix the construction of the variables we use in our
analysis.
First, note that all the Gini indexes of inequality used in this paper
are only available on annual basis and our SVARs models are estimated in
monthly frequency. Given that Gini direct measures of inequality have low
variation, the interpolation to monthly frequency is justifiable. We follow
Davtyan (2017) to interpolate the Gini indexes. Specifically, we use the first
difference approach of Boot et al. (1967). Data for the annual Gini coeffi-
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cients are disaggregated to monthly frequency such that the average of the
interpolated series is equal to the corresponding aggregate value. As direct
measures of income and wealth inequality, we use the interpolated Gini coef-
ficient from the World Inequality Database (WID). We take these variables
on annual basis from 1982 to 2014 (last available year) to interpolate the
Gini coefficients from annual frequency to monthly series. In addition, to
check our direct effect on income inequality we use the Gini index of pre-tax
income and the Gini index of post-tax income provided by Coibion 7. These
variables are constructed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and
carefully explained by Coibion et al. (2017). The period of these variables
are only available from 1980Q1 to 2008Q4. Thus, we interpolate the series
to monthly frequency.
To assess the final effect of monetary policy on wealth distribution taking
into account the portfolio and housing channels, we built micro-level data se-
ries with the evolution of real stock prices and real house prices. According
to Wolff (2016), the wealth distribution of the different groups is surprisingly
similar over time. Hence, we have built the series for different wealth groups
(top 1, next 19 per cent and Middle 3 quintiles) calculating the changes in
stock and house prices in each month for each wealth group, taking into ac-
count the proportion of wealth that each group holds in different assets. This
proportion can be found in table B.1. Taking this distinction into account,
we want to see how an expansive monetary policy affects the wealth of the
different groups according to the assets that each group holds. As shown in
Table B.1, in 2016, the richest one percent of households (ranked by wealth),
7We thank Olivier Coibion for providing us these income inequality measures.
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held only 7.6 per cent of their wealth in housing, conversely, they invested
80 percent of their savings in investment real estate, businesses, corporate
stock, and financial securities. On the other hand, we can see that the middle
three quintiles held, in the same year, 61.9 per cent of their wealth in housing
and around of 12 per cent in financial investments. As the distribution of
liquid assets is similar across the three wealth groups and does not represent
much of total wealth, we exclude it from our analysis. This analysis assumes
that households do not adjust their portfolios in response to monetary pol-
icy. A similar estimation is undertaken by Lenza and Slacalek (2018) for the
Eurozone. As they argue, this seems a reasonable approximation according
to the evidence found by Wolff (2016) Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) or Bilias
et al. (2010). All of them provide evidence for the sluggishness in household
portfolios in both illiquid and financial assets.
Table B.1: Household Wealth Composition (2016)
Percent of gross assets
2016





Principal Residence 7.6 25.6 61.9 25.1
Liquid assets 4.6 7.7 8.5 6.7
Financial investments (Without pensions) 80.4 43.1 11.8 51.3
Pensions accounts and other assets 7.4 23.6 17.8 16.9
Total assets 100 100 100 100
Source: author’s calculations based on Wolff (2016) from the 2016 SCF.
Households are classified into wealth class according to their net worth.
Brackets for 2016 are:
Top one percent: Net worth of $10,257,000 or more.
Next 19 percent: Net worth between $471,600 and $10,257,000.
Quintiles 2 through 4: Net worth between $0 and $471,600.
Second, to explore the transmission channels we use the following vari-
ables:
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For the saving redistribution channel, the ten-year real interest rate is
used as representative. We take the difference between the ten-year nominal
interest rate and the inflation rate of the consumer price index (CPI) to
obtain the real interest rate. Both variables are obtained from Datastream.
To assess the extensive margin of the earnings heterogeneity channel we
follow Carpenter and Rodgers (2004) to construct the ethnic differences in
unemployment rates. The unemployment rate data is directly taken from
Datastream. Likewise, to explore the intensive margin of the the earnings
heterogeneity channel we use the ratio between labour earnings of white
Americans and black workers. To build the labour earnings of each racial
groups, we use data from the NBER extracts of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups. The extracts contain data
on employment, education level, employment status and earnings as well as
background variables as race, sex, age and geographic location, among others.
The individuals included in the sample are those of working age (from 15 to
64 years), and those that are neither war veterans nor part-time workers
nor self-employed. CPS provides monthly data from 1979 to 2017. Labour
earnings series for each race were constructed by the ratio between weekly
earnings and usual hours worked.
To analyze the income composition channel, first, we use the real wages
defined as the average hourly earnings of production and non supervisory
employees (private) deflated by the CPI. We take the nominal and price
deflator from Datastream. Second, we use the real dividends directly taken
from Robert Shiller‘s webpage.
To assess the portfolio channel, we use the (log) real stock price index (SP
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500) and the (log) real stock price index (Dow Jones) to check the results.
Both indices have been obtained from Datastream.
Real S&P/Case-Shiller national home price directly taken from Robert
Shiller‘s webpage and real rents defined as rent of primary residence deflacted
by CPI from Datastream are used to explore the housing channel.
For assessing the fiscal channel, we use the U.S. non-defense Government
expenditures and the U.S. gross government investment. These data are
collected by Datastream in quarterly frequency. Quarterly data is seasonally
adjusted with X-ARIMA-13 and linearly interpolated to monthly frequency.
We convert it to real terms using the CPI.
The rest of the variables of the model are taken from Datasteam. These
are the consumer price index, the industrial production index and the excess
bond premium which is a financial indicator built by Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek
(2012).
As policy indicator we have used the one-year Government treasury bill
yield collected by Datastream and to conduct a robustness check we use the
Wu-Xia shadow rate developed by Wu and Xia (2016).
Finally, our own monetary policy shocks are built using intraday Fed-
eral Fund futures obtained by www.tickdatamarket.com (see last section for
further details on the construction of the shocks)
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Appendix C. First-stage regression
Table C.2: First-stage regression for each specification
First-Stage Regression F-statistic
Baseline 26.36
Baseline using Gini index of Wealth Inequality 22.33
Baseline using Coibion et al. (2017) income inequality measures 21.12
Baseline using alternative specifications for the inequality channels 25.25
Baseline up to 2008 23.33
Baseline using the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate 25.94
Baseline using SBC criterion 30.28
Baseline using Bayesian Local Projections 24.86
For all cases, results on first-stage regression show that the relevance
condition is satisfied. The F-statistic is widely above the threshold suggested
by Stock et al. (2002) and therefore we avoid weak instrument problems.
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Appendix D. Robustness checks
Figure D.7: Inequality measures for the baseline considering the shadow rate
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline
considering the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate. Sample: 1982M1:2014M2.
Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.8: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline considering the shadow rate
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline considering the
Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate. Sample: 1982M1:2014M2. Shaded regions
represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.9: Inequality measures for the baseline before the financial crisis
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:2008M8. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
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Figure D.10: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline before the financial crisis
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline. Sample:
1982M1:2008M8. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.11: Inequality measures for the baseline after a forward guidance monetary policy
shock
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
51
Figure D.12: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline after a forward guidance
monetary policy shock
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline. Sample:
1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.13: Inequality measures for the baseline after a LSAP monetary policy shock
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:20012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
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Figure D.14: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline after a LSAP monetary
policy shock
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline. Sample:
1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.15: Inequality measures for the baseline under the SBC
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline.
Sample: 1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence
bands.
55
Figure D.16: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline under the SBC
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline. Sample:
1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.17: Inequality measures for the baseline using BLP
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the direct measures of income and wealth inequality from the baseline
estimated by the BLP methology. Sample: 1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions
represent 90% posterior confidence bands.
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Figure D.18: Inequality transmission channels for the baseline using BLP
Note: IRFs to a 20 basis point decrease in the one-year government treasury bill
for the monetary policy transmission channels from the baseline estimated by the
BLP methology. Sample: 1982M1:2012M12. Shaded regions represent 90%
posterior confidence bands.
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